Generative AI risks
Twelve generative AI risk areas and ways to manage them
Source: NIST AI 600-1, Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, July 2024
1. Introduction
Generative AI creates text, images, audio or other content from learned patterns. This guide draws on NIST AI 600-1. It is not a legal definition or a binding severity classification.
The NIST AI RMF and its generative AI profile are voluntary. The controls, templates and priorities below are our suggested examples to adapt; they do not reproduce NIST actions verbatim or determine statutory duties.
What makes these risks distinctive?
| Aspect | Predictive or classification AI | Generative AI |
|---|---|---|
| Outputs | Predictions and classifications | Synthetic content |
| Predictability | Depends on the model and inputs | Also depends on generation settings and interaction context |
| Scale | Depends on architecture and infrastructure | Depends on architecture and infrastructure |
| Misuse | Depends on purpose, access and impact | Additional scenarios involving synthetic content and connected tools |
| Unexpected behaviour | Possible outside tested conditions | Can also emerge from open-ended tasks and interactions |
2. Overview of the 12 risk areas
The grouping below is an example of internal prioritisation, not a severity rating assigned by NIST. Environmental impacts, for example, depend on the scale and conditions of operation.
3. Risk areas in detail
R1: CBRN information or capabilities
Scope: easier access to information or capabilities that could enable chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear harm.
Possible scenarios include assistance with dangerous substances, biological design tools that extend specialist capabilities, and combinations of generative AI with other tools that increase the potential for harm.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Content filtering | Preventive | Restrict inappropriate CBRN-related assistance |
| Query monitoring | Detective | Identify suspicious patterns within an appropriate monitoring policy |
| User verification | Preventive | Verify access for sensitive use cases |
| Incident escalation | Corrective | Escalate to appropriate specialists or authorities where relevant |
Legal assessment: examine the precise prohibited practices and other applicable laws. CBRN as a whole is not a separate prohibited category under AI Act Article 5.
R2: Confabulation
Scope: content that is presented confidently but is false or misleading.
Language models generate plausible continuations rather than automatically checking every statement against ground truth. Errors can include invented legal citations, incorrect medical information, fabricated facts in articles or inaccurate technical instructions.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Fact-checking policy | Preventive | Define which outputs require independent verification |
| Retrieval-augmented generation | Preventive | Use reviewed sources; retrieval does not guarantee correct citations or eliminate hallucinations |
| Calibrated indicators | Detective | Use validated uncertainty measures; confident wording is not a probability of correctness |
| Human review | Detective | Specialist review of consequential outputs |
| Automated checks | Detective | Detect selected inconsistencies and verify claims where possible |
| User education | Preventive | Explain capabilities and limitations |
Example internal policy:
## VERIFYING GENERATIVE AI OUTPUTS
1. Do not use generative AI as the sole authority for legal documents, medical information, financial decisions or critical infrastructure.2. Verify consequential factual claims using appropriate independent sources.3. Disclose AI involvement where required by law, contract or internal policy.4. Record significant false outputs and use them to improve evaluation.R3: Dangerous, violent or hateful content
Scope: easier production of violent, radicalising or hateful content.
Risk scenarios include bypassing safeguards, generating extremist material, instructions for violence or self-harm, and spreading hatred.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Content moderation | Preventive | Input and output controls |
| Safeguard testing | Preventive | Regular authorised tests of bypass resistance |
| Acceptable use rules | Preventive | Clear terms and prohibited behaviour |
| Appropriate event records | Detective | A proportionate audit trail |
| Reporting mechanism | Corrective | Accessible reporting and escalation |
| Account restrictions | Corrective | Enforce the applicable policy |
R4: Data privacy
Scope: exposure of personal data from training or use, and inference of sensitive information.
Models may reproduce personal data, infer sensitive attributes from apparently ordinary information, or enable processing that conflicts with purpose limitation and other GDPR principles.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Data classification | Preventive | Define what may enter each approved service |
| Personal data detection | Detective | Scan relevant outputs with human escalation |
| Training restrictions | Preventive | Agree and configure appropriate limits on provider use of data |
| DPIA | Preventive | Complete where processing is likely to result in high risk under GDPR Article 35 |
| Anonymisation | Preventive | Apply suitable preprocessing and assess re-identification risk |
| Access controls | Preventive | Restrict users, systems and connected tools |
Privacy checklist:
- Establish a legal basis for processing.
- Provide appropriate information to data subjects.
- Minimise personal data.
- Respect purpose limitation.
- Enable applicable data subject rights.
- Put an Article 28 GDPR contract or other legal act in place where the provider acts as a processor.
- Complete a DPIA where required.
R5: Environmental impacts
Scope: environmental effects of training and operating generative AI models.
- Consumption depends on the model, hardware, utilisation and workload.
- Emissions depend on the energy mix and measurement boundary.
- Water impacts depend on cooling and energy production in the relevant location. A universal conversion such as “one language model equals a fixed number of flights” is not useful.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Provider assessment | Preventive | Compare relevant, supported environmental information |
| Model efficiency | Preventive | Use a smaller model where it meets task requirements |
| Caching | Preventive | Reduce unnecessary repeated work where appropriate |
| Footprint measurement | Detective | Track consumption and estimates with stated boundaries |
| Relevant reporting | Detective | Include material impacts in applicable reporting |
R6: Harmful bias and homogenisation
Scope: stereotyped outputs, unequal performance across groups and excessive uniformity of information or decisions.
Examples include gender stereotypes, poorer performance for minority groups or languages, degradation associated with unsuitable synthetic training data, and correlated outcomes from widespread use of similar models.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Bias assessment | Preventive | Evaluate before deployment |
| Diverse evaluation | Preventive | Test relevant groups, languages and contexts |
| Fairness monitoring | Detective | Track justified metrics and investigate impacts |
| Human oversight | Detective | Meaningful review in consequential uses such as hiring |
| Diverse expertise | Preventive | Include different perspectives in evaluation |
| Feedback channels | Corrective | Enable people to report harmful outcomes |
Possible evaluation datasets include WinoBias and Winogender for gender bias, BBQ for social biases, and RealToxicityPrompts for toxicity. Assess whether each dataset fits the intended use; a benchmark result is not a universal fairness verdict.
R7: Human–AI configuration
Scope: risks arising from interaction between people and AI, including overreliance, unwarranted distrust and anthropomorphism.
| Risk | Description | Possible response |
|---|---|---|
| Automation bias | Excessive trust in outputs | Critical thinking and verification practices |
| Algorithmic aversion | Unjustified rejection of useful outputs | Relevant explanations and evidence |
| Emotional entanglement | Unhealthy reliance on an AI interaction | Clear identity, appropriate boundaries and support options |
| Anthropomorphism | Mistaking human-like language for human qualities | Interface design that communicates the system’s role and limits |
Example internal interaction guidance:
## HUMAN–AI INTERACTION
1. Make the system's identity clear. - Tell users when they are interacting with an AI assistant. - Avoid design choices that mislead users about its role or capabilities.
2. Support critical judgement. - AI can make mistakes. - Verify consequential information. - Assign accountable people and meaningful decision authority.
3. Set appropriate boundaries. - Do not present the system as a substitute for qualified human support. - Do not infer human feelings or understanding from conversational style. - Provide a suitable route to human help when needed.R8: Information integrity
Scope: misinformation, deliberate disinformation, deepfakes and erosion of trust.
Scenarios include large-scale fabricated news, synthetic video or audio, invented evidence and content that undermines confidence in reliable information.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Content provenance | Preventive | Provenance metadata or watermarking where suitable |
| Synthetic media detection | Detective | Detection tools used with known limitations |
| Disclosure | Preventive | Labelling required by law, contract or policy |
| Fact-checking | Detective | Verify relevant claims and sources |
| Media literacy | Preventive | Train users to assess information critically |
Provenance approaches include digital watermarking, metadata standards such as C2PA, fingerprinting and authenticated publishing processes. Provenance can help establish origin and editing history; it does not by itself prove that a claim is true.
R9: Information security
Scope: generative AI as both a tool for and a target of cyberattacks.
Potential misuse includes phishing, malicious code assistance and social engineering. Attacks against AI systems include prompt injection, data poisoning and model extraction.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Input validation | Preventive | Validate schema and size; cleaning prompt text alone is insufficient |
| Prompt injection controls | Preventive | Separate untrusted content and limit the impact of a bypass |
| Rate limits | Preventive | Restrict abuse |
| Access controls | Preventive | Authenticate and authorise actions |
| Logging | Detective | Maintain a proportionate audit trail |
| Incident response | Corrective | Prepare an AI-specific response procedure |
To reduce prompt injection risk:
- Treat user text, websites, documents and tool outputs as untrusted input. Instructions inside them must not grant permissions.
- Enforce permissions and action parameter validation outside the model. Apply least privilege, data isolation and appropriate outbound communication limits.
- Require an authorised person to approve consequential actions. Show the specific action and target being approved.
- Validate outputs before using them in code, SQL, HTML or another tool. Context-aware escaping addresses those injection surfaces; it is not a universal defence against prompt injection.
- Test direct and indirect attacks and repeat relevant tests after model changes. Logging, filters and structured prompts provide additional layers, not a guarantee that the risk is eliminated.
R10: Intellectual property
Scope: infringement, reproduction of training material and uncertainty about rights in inputs and outputs.
Scenarios include reproducing protected content, misusing a person’s identity and misunderstanding rights in generated material. The legal assessment depends on the jurisdiction, material, human contribution and intended use.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| IP policy | Preventive | Rules for inputs, outputs and publication |
| Rights review | Detective | Review before publication or commercial use |
| Attribution and disclosure | Preventive | Meet applicable licence, contractual and legal requirements |
| Contract review | Preventive | Understand supplier terms and risk allocation |
| Training data information | Detective | Review available supplier documentation |
Example policy structure:
## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENERATIVE AI
1. Rights in outputs - Treat generated material as input to further work and review. - Assess human contribution and applicable rights before publication.
2. Permitted inputs and use - Use third-party material only where the proposed use is permitted. - Do not make unsupported claims of originality or ownership.
3. Attribution - Disclose AI assistance where relevant or required. - Follow applicable licences and supplier terms.
4. Due diligence - Check outputs for infringement and misleading similarity. - Record relevant sources, permissions and review decisions.R11: Obscene, degrading or abusive content
Scope: harmful content including child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII).
An organisation should define strict prohibitions and an effective response process for these forms of abuse.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Prohibited-use policy | Preventive | Clear rules and technical restrictions |
| Content controls | Preventive | Appropriate filtering and access boundaries |
| Detection | Detective | Suitable tools and trained escalation roles |
| Reporting and response | Corrective | Follow applicable law and the relevant authority or platform process |
| Controlled testing | Preventive | Verify safeguards without creating or distributing illegal material |
Define the applicable reporting process with qualified specialists for the jurisdiction, organisation’s role and event, including the recipient and whether a duty to report to the US National Center for Missing & Exploited Children arises. Include protection of affected people and lawful evidence handling.
AI Act: the new Article 5(1)(ba) and (bb) prohibitions, added by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, apply from 2 December 2026. They cover specified realistic intimate or sexually explicit material depicting an identifiable person without freely given, specific, informed, unambiguous and explicit consent, and material or performances defined in Article 2(c) and (e) of Directive 2011/93/EU; (bb) preserves grounds excluding unlawfulness under national law. Article 5(1a) limits placing on the market or putting into service to cases involving either the system’s intended purpose, or a reasonably foreseeable and reproducible outcome without significant technical modification where proportionate and appropriate safeguards reliably preventing such generation or manipulation and correcting identified or reported misuse are absent. Prohibited use requires use for that purpose. For the prohibition in point (ba) only, Article 5(1b) does not treat as manipulation changes that neither increase exposure of depicted intimate parts nor change the nature of explicitly depicted sexual activities. Assess the complete Article 5(1a)–(1b) and Article 113(a).
R12: Value chain and component integration
Scope: risks from third-party components, unclear provenance and insufficiently assessed dependencies.
Examples include an unknown origin of a pretrained model, biased external datasets, vulnerable libraries and errors in benchmark labels.
| Control | Type | Implementation example |
|---|---|---|
| Supplier due diligence | Preventive | Assessment before acquisition |
| Model documentation | Preventive | Review model cards and relevant limitations |
| Component inventory | Detective | Maintain software and model dependency records |
| Contractual requirements | Preventive | Agree relevant service and security conditions |
| Exit planning | Preventive | Prepare for replacing a supplier or component |
| Periodic review | Detective | Monitor relevant changes and vulnerabilities |
4. Implementation matrix
Example starting priorities
These are discussion prompts, not fixed sector ratings. A system’s purpose, users and possible harm determine the actual priorities.
| Organisation or use context | Example starting risk areas |
|---|---|
| General enterprise use | R2, R4, R9, R6, R12 |
| Healthcare | R2, R4, R6, R11, R1 |
| Finance | R2, R4, R6, R9, R10 |
| Media and marketing | R8, R10, R2, R6, R3 |
| Education | R2, R6, R4, R8, R7 |
| Critical infrastructure | R9, R1, R8, R12, R4 |
Possible early improvements
| Action | Illustrative effort | Potential impact | Risk areas |
|---|---|---|---|
| Define verification for consequential claims | Low | High | R2, R8 |
| Establish personal data rules for approved tools | Low | High | R4 |
| Review content safeguards | Medium | High | R3, R11 |
| Clarify AI identity and disclosure | Low | Medium | R7, R8 |
| Assess relevant suppliers | Medium | High | R12 |
5. Assess the risks in your organisation
Use a quick scan to identify questions that need deeper analysis. For a full assessment, document the system, applicable risk areas, evidence, existing controls, gaps, owners and residual-risk decisions. A questionnaire count or a completion percentage does not establish compliance.
The assessment overview explains how to choose the right depth. Combine these risk areas with MAP, MEASURE and MANAGE.
6. References
- NIST AI 600-1: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile
- EU AI Act, consolidated text
- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
- NIST generative AI profile in this framework
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